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Source: Iain Davis
The Unacknowledged False Flag Substack series explores the evidence that indicates reported terrorist attacks were actually false flags orchestrated by elements within governments or those aligned to state interests. Unlike 9/11 or 7/7, these likely false flags are often overlooked. We’ll look at the evidence that suggests they were either allowed to happen (Let It Happen On Purpose - LIHOP), were directly facilitated (Make It Happen On Purpose - MIHOP) or were faked (hoaxes).
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On 7th October 2023, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, led an attack into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip, which was then home to some 2.2 million Palestinians. This was claimed as justification by the Israeli government for its barbaric assault on the Palestinian people that the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) accurately describes as “consistent with the characteristics of genocide.”
The Israeli government response to the Hamas attack is, quite obviously, the genocide of the Palestinian people. What did Hamas expect?
Hamas called its attack Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Israelis calls it the Simchat Torah Massacre or Black Saturday. We’ll refer to it as “the Hamas Attack” for no other reason than that being the most common nomenclature outside of Israel.
In January 2025, the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) passed a law making it an offence, punishable by up to a five year prison, for “denying the October 7 massacre [. . .] with the intention of defending, sympathizing with, or identifying with the Hamas terrorist organization and its partners.” These articles are not a “denial” of the Hamas attack.
Nor, anywhere in this article, is the term “Israeli government,” or any other related term, used as a “code word for Jews.” I do not consider Jewish people to be any more able to control the actions of the Israeli government than I, as a British citizen, am able to control the British government. But we are all culpable to an extent.
Many Jewish people support the genocide of the Palestinians just as many British people supported the mass illegal murder of a conservatively estimated half a million Iraqi men, women and children. The ease with which some of us applaud indiscriminate slaughter is not a problem specific to one religious or culture. It is a problem for humanity.
Too many of us “trust” one authority figure or another—be it a political leader or a god—to do the right thing in our names. We watch evil proliferate because we imagine it’s for the greater good or some such other tripe. Ultimately, we exonerate ourselves with these inhuman beliefs. It’s not our problem until our children are burning in their beds.
I acknowledge the reported estimate of 1,195 Hamas attack fatalities, around 800 of whom were civilians, including infants and children. The Hamas attack was a despicable act of horrific violence. Nothing justifies it and I do not defend, sympathise nor identify with Hamas or its Islamist extremist partners. I do point to the evidence indicating that Hamas would not exist were it not for the consistent longstanding support it has received over the years from the Israeli government and its “partners.”
It is not clear, however, how many Israeli’s were killed by Hamas and how many were killed by Israeli forces. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israeli Air force, at least, has conceded that it was running “the Sword of Damocles” operation on October 7th 2023. This was in line with the Hannibal Procedure which directs Israeli Defence Force (IDF) troops to kill their own comrades instead of allowing them to be taken hostage. It was supposedly abandoned in 2008, but Col. Nof Erez, a senior IDF reserve helicopter pilot, told Haaretz that the carnage he had seen appeared to be a “mass Hannibal.”
Yedioth Ahronoth (Ynetnews) reported that the IDF admitted that “casualties fell as a result of friendly fire [. . .] in the kibbutzim and southern Israeli communities.” Yet IDF spokespersons added that it would not be “morally sound to investigate these incidents due to the immense and complex quantity of them.”
Numerous media reports and witness testimony from Kibbutzim and the festival suggest the possibility that a significant proportion of civilian deaths were likely the result of so-called “friendly fire.” Until the “immense” quantity of these “friendly fire” incident is properly investigated, the number of Israelis killed by their own government’s forces will remain unknown. Therefore, the numbers killed by Hamas is equally unknowable.
The Official Story
At approximately 06.30 on 7th October 2023, Hamas launched a mass rocket attack on Israel. Approximately 5,000 rockets were launched, some northward toward the Sharon Plain, striking cities like Gedera, Tel Aviv, and Ashkelon. Others were launched eastward toward cities like Be’er Shiva and towns like Ofakim and Netivot.
The bombardment coincided with a ground assault into southern Israel by an estimated 2,900 “fighters” primarily from the al-Qassam Brigades but also incorporating a notable contingent from the al-Quds Brigades (AQB)—the military arm of Islamic Jihad. They stormed the Israeli barrier surrounding Gaza known as the Iron Wall. Reportedly, they breached this high-tech defence simultaneously in 29 separate locations.
In addition, Hamas launched maritime attacks—notably on the IDF Bahad 4 base near Zikim—and accompanying aerial assaults. The al-Qassam Brigades and AQB used commercial drones to drop small explosive devices that disabled the automatic machine guns and surveillance antennae lining the Iron Wall. Importantly, these devices took out all of the key cellular communication towers along the Israeli defensive line. The Hamas fighters also flew small motorised para-gliders over the Israeli defences and used them to attack multiple targets behind the “wall” during the Attack.
Once small breaches were secured, bulldozers were used to enlarge them, This facilitated entry by a vanguard of fighters who stormed Israeli territory on foot, on motorcycles or in 4x4’s or trucks. Thus enabling relatively large numbers to enter and join the assault in minutes rather than hours.
The Re’im music festival—often referred to as the Nova Music Festival—was among the first locations attacked and is the place where the single largest loss of life occurred. In total 344 civilians and 34 security personnel were murdered.
Numerous kibbutzim, towns and villages within an approximate 30-mile radius of the Gazan border were attacked. Massacres were reported at Sderot, Kfar Aza, Nahal Oz, Be’eri, Nir Oz, Ashkelon and many other locations.
Key to disabling Israeli defences were the attacks on numerous IDF military basis and strategic positions. Between 06:30 and 08:30, the al-Qassam Brigades and the AQB successfully overran the Erez Crossing, the Nahal Oz military base, the base located near the Be’eri kibbutz, the Sufa outpost, the Re’im military base and a IDF observation facility near the Kerem Shalom kibbutz.
Of these, perhaps the most crucial raid was on the Nahal Oz surveillance control center and, within it, the all-female team of IDF “spotters” stationed in the Nahal Oz observation room—aka “situation room.”
The Nahal Oz base is home to the IDF Unit 414, which specialises in combat intelligence. Unit 414’s role is to gather intelligence in real time and disseminate that information to IDF field units. The female spotters in the Nahal Oz situation room were monitoring the surveillance cameras along the “Iron Wall.” From there, they would have dispatched forces to investigate suspicious activity or respond to any attacks. In addition, the unit oversees the multiple command centres for various IDF positions along the border.
Another significant and simultaneous attack by Hamas that morning was made on the Re’im military base. This is the headquarters of the IDF’s 143rd Gaza Division, which has primary responsibility for defending southern Israel in the immediate vicinity of the Gaza border. It is the first port of call for the Nahal Oz spotters. It appears that the al-Qassam Brigades held the Re’im base for most of the day.
By holding the Re’im military base for so long, a cluster of senior Israeli military commanders were captured or killed by Hamas in one location. As reported by the The New York Times:
[The attack on the Re’im military base,] combined with the communication problems caused by the drone strikes, prevented a coordinated response. This kept anyone along the border from grasping the full breadth of the assault, including the commanders who rushed from elsewhere in Israel to launch a counterattack.
By taking out the cell towers and Nahal Oz and by holding Re’im for many hours, the al-Qassam and al-Quds Brigades’ operation hobbled the IDF reponse. It was four hours before the IDF made any defence of the surrounding towns and villages and up to six hours before the IDF fully engaged with any Hamas-led forces. This allowed the al-Qassam and Al-Quds Brigades ample opportunity to seize military objectives, kill Israelis, take hostages and still have enough time to retreat to Gaza, hostages in tow.
The Unbelievable Official Story
We are led to believe that the Israeli government, its intelligence agencies and its military forces were taken by complete surprise by the Hamas Attack. Hamas was able to operate with relative impunity for many hours and the Israeli response was so disjointed that the billions it had spent on its defences was rendered entirely pointless for the best part of a day.
Yet, when we look at the evidence, this suggestion is utterly implausible. Any notion that Hamas could have planned, prepared, and executed the attack, and then escape with Israeli hostages without Israeli complicity is, frankly, absurd.
All the evidence clearly suggests that the October 7th Hamas Attack was a LIHOP false flag operation. It is impossible to conceive how it could have unfolded as it did without the connivance of elements within the Israeli government—or powerful forces aligned with Israeli state objectives—who deliberately allowed the Hamas Attack to proceed.
It is that evidence that we shall explore in detail in Part 2.
The purpose and scope of the Unacknowledged False Flag Substack series is explained HERE.
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In Part 1 we looked at the official account of the October 7th Hamas Attack. In addition to a rocket barrage on multiple targets and maritime assaults, an estimated 2,900 Hamas-aligned “terrorists” breached the Israeli “Iron Wall” defences surrounding Gaza in 29 separate locations simultaneously. The “terrorists” took out all the vital communication infrastructure and key Israeli strategic positions, thus leaving Israeli defences unable to respond for many hours. The attack surprised the Israeli intelligence community which was taken off guard by the scale and speed of the Hamas Attack.
Before we start to examine the evidence revealing the absurdity of the official account we should pause to think about what the word “terrorist” means.
There is no clear definition of “terrorism” in international law. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-terrorism, Professor Ben Saul, points out that the "ordinary meaning of terrorism is simple: extreme fear." So why is the Hamas Attack considered an act of terrorism while the Israeli firebombing of Palestinian children in their schools, refugee camps and hospital beds is called an act of war?
Saul notes that intergovernmental consensus determines terrorism to be “criminal violence intended to intimidate a population or coerce a government or international organisation; some national laws add a further specific intention to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause.” As Hamas represents the government of the Palestinian people of Gaza, the murder of thousands of Palestinian children by the Israeli government is, by definition, “criminal violence intended to intimidate a population [and] coerce a government.” If international law meant anything at all, the Israeli response to the Hamas Attack would also be called an act of “terrorism.”
It isn’t of course because “international law” is just a fabricated stick wielded by the powerful to oppress whomever. It enables governments to claim the “legal authority” to kill indiscriminately. When they can’t obtain that “legal” approval the most powerful governments don’t pay any heed to its absence and murder people anyway.
Over the years, the Israeli government has completely ignored numerous binding and non-binding UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. So What? It doesn’t mean anything. The application and enforcement of “international law” is as arbitrary as the designation of terrorist groups. The intergovernmental consensus on “terrorism,” then, is an overtly political propaganda construct. “Might is right” is the full extent of this international legalese drivel and labels like “terrorist” are stuck on some violent aggressors but not others for purely propagandist reasons.
This does not excuse mass murder, such as that perpetrated by Hamas during its October 7th Attack. It is merely to point out that calling the Hamas Attack “terrorism” but then refusing to call Israeli barbarity “terrorism” is so hypocritical it renders the whole “terrorism” concept moot. We should either apply the terrorist designation to all, including governments, who systematically slaughter innocent people to cause “extreme fear,” or to none.
Hamas Attack: Intelligence Failures?
In October 2024 the Combating Terrorism Center (CTR) at the US West Point military training academy produced analysis of the Israeli Intelligence “failings” that supposedly led to the “surprise” October 7th Hamas Attack. The CTR analysis provides us with a reasonably full official account:
Hamas leaders themselves have noted the group’s surprise at the ease with which its operatives breached the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from Israel, as well as the slowness of the Israeli response. [. . .] Israel misread Hamas’ intentions. [. . .] Shin Bet [Israeli domestic intelligence - ISA] has been primarily responsible for HUMINT [human intelligence] in Gaza and Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) for SIGINT [signals intelligence]. Israel had managed to collect some information that could have been considered indicators pointing to the attack. [. . .] [F]or more than a year before October 7, the IDF had reportedly been in possession of a document, the “Jericho Wall” file, that outlines a plan to invade Israel that largely corresponds to the October 7 events. [. . .] [I]n July 2023, a non-commissioned officer in AMAN’s 8200 SIGINT unit warned that a recent exercise by the group “closely followed the Jericho Wall plan, and that Hamas was building the capacity to carry it out.” [. . .] the Gaza Division subsequently prepared a document warning that Hamas was planning a large-scale invasion and intended to take up to 250 hostages. [. . .] Unit 8200 sent another warning to a number of IDF officers a few days before October 7, urging them to make preparations to minimize the impact of the expected attack. [. . .] [T]he head of AMAN’s “Devil’s Advocate” or “Red Team” unit [. . .] issued four warnings in the three weeks before October 7 that Hamas “would soon launch a confrontation with Israel, because it identified deep processes that were fundamentally changing the strategic situation.” [. . .] [N]either Shin Bet nor AMAN were able to detect additional indicators and suspicious activities. [. . .] Israel’s inability to detect the impending attacks was not the result of a single glaring failure but rather the result of multiple problems at different levels and across the various intelligence services and the top political and military echelons.
The official narrative, then, is that despite the frankly massive amount of intelligence suggesting an attack was imminent, multiple intelligence “failures” combined to enable Hamas to stroll through the Iron Wall [Gaza prison wall] defences and carry out their Attack. The CTR observation that “neither Shin Bet nor AMAN were able to detect additional indicators” is pointless. Both Shin Bet and AMAN operatives gave ample warning and provided quite specific intelligence suggesting an attack was imminent. What need was there for any “additional indicators”?
As reported by the New York Times, and mentioned by the CTR, In April 2022 IDF military intelligence (AMAN) had come into possession of a Hamas strategic plan which AMAN code named “Jerricho Wall.” This was the blueprint for the Hamas Attack. The NYT reported:
Hamas followed the blueprint [Jericho Wall] with shocking precision. The document called for a barrage of rockets at the outset of the attack, drones to knock out the security cameras and automated machine guns along the border, and gunmen to pour into Israel en masse in paragliders, on motorcycles and on foot — all of which happened on Oct. 7.
On September 12th, four weeks before the Attack, Hamas produced its customary “Strong Pillar” training exercise video. While this was an annual Hamas propaganda event, nonetheless it showed Hamas training for “Jerricho Wall.” The Associated Press reported that the video showed Hamas:
[U]sing explosives to blast through a replica of the border gate, sweep in on pickup trucks and then move building by building through a full-scale reconstruction of an Israeli town, firing automatic weapons at human-silhouetted paper targets.
That no one in Israeli intelligence supposedly took any of this seriously is stretching “failure” plausibility to breaking point. But even if it was attributable to failures, the suggestion that the Hamas Attack came as a “surprise” is idiotic.
The Jewish Virtual library reported that IDF intelligence chief Aharon Ze’evi-Farkash acknowledged that “Jerricho Wall” revealed that “Hamas was not deterred.” Yet, in July 2023, when an AMAN Unit 8200 officer said that training exercises that looked just like “Jerricho Wall” were escalating, adding that they did not look like preparation for “just a raid on a village” but rather “a plan designed to start a war,” that too was ignored by the Israeli chain of command.
It wasn’t just Israeli intelligence that warned of an impending attack either. Menachem Gida, leader of a team of 26 Israeli hobbyists—who routinely monitored Gaza’s communications network—repeatedly warned the IDF about the likely attack. They were openly discussing it on their “Field Security Operational Monitor” WhatsApp group. The civilians reportedly appraised the IDF, in the days leading up to the attack, that Hamas was “practicing the breaching of the fence and arriving from the sea, conquering kibbutzim such as Zikim, Netiv Ha’asara and Nir Oz, seizing hostages and destroying everything.”
Yifat Ben Shoshan, a resident of Netiv HaAsara and a tour guide for Israeli towns and Kibbutzim on the Gazan border, was interviewed by the Kan 11 radio station a few days before the Hamas Attack. She said:
I hope Hamas isn’t planning a second Yom Kippur. [. . .] For years they had been gradually improving their capabilities, especially their rocket system. And they’d been training for weeks right up against the border, sometimes in massive numbers. I tried to warn the officers, but they told me I didn’t know anything about it and that I was safe.
Shoshan recognised that the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, (October 6th 1973) when Egypt and Syria launched a “surprise” attack on Israel, was of particular symbolic significance for Hamas and represented a moment of heightened risk. Yet, we are told, no one in an Israeli position of authority managed to make this mental leap.
Instead, the decision was made to concentrate 25 IDF Battalions in the West Bank and leave just 4 guarding Gaza over the anniversary period. On October 5th 2023, two elite commando companies were moved from Gaza to the West Bank, leaving just 600 regular IDF soldiers (conscripts) spread thinly along the Gazan border.
Supposedly, the policy of arming Israeli settlers is to enable them to defend themselves against “terrorist” attacks, rather than kill unarmed Palestinians as often seems to be the case—especially in the West Bank. Yet, in the years and months leading up to the Hamas Attack, civilians on the Gazan border, such as local security coordinators Rafi Babian, had protested vigorously against the IDF program of removing weapons from southern border communities.
As noted by West Point’s CTR, AMAN Unit 8200 operatives operating in the Gazan Division gave very precise warnings about the looming Hamas Attack, even down to accurate estimates of how many hostages they were planning to take. Military spotters and observers at places like the Nahal Oz observation room, and civilians alike, had evidently been reporting increasing Hamas activity. A Unit 8200 operative sent an email to her superiors just three weeks before the Attack saying:
The sword is coming [. . .] warn the people. [. . .] The other side is determined in its intentions to carry out its plan. If the plan is implemented painful and difficult fighting is expected.
Israeli government officials denied receiving intelligence alerts from Egypt three days prior to the Hamas attack. Post the attack, this led Egypt’s intelligence minister to state:
We have warned them [Israeli intelligence] an explosion of the situation is coming, and very soon, and it would be big. But they underestimated such warnings.
“Underestimated” appears to be diplomatic code for “completely ignored.”
All this intelligence perhaps explains why, the night before the Hamas Attack, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Aharon Haliva, head of military intelligence, met to discuss why Hamas was mobilising. Although perhaps it doesn’t because they didn’t alert anyone nor try to strengthen any Israeli defences and took absolutely no precautionary measures whatsoever.
In the weeks leading up to the Hamas Attack what “additional indicators” did any Israeli intelligence chief or military commander need to call for regional defences to be strengthened? Instead the process of weakening them continued.
The Israeli news outlet Haaretz wrote:
The IDF and Shin Bet had no intelligence warning to indicate Hamas’ intention of invading Israel in large numbers. The Southern Command even allowed the transfer to the West Bank of three battalions who operated in the sector, in order to reinforce the troops there over the holiday.
No intelligence warnings?
Haaretz went on to say that on the day of the attack “Southern Command and the Gaza Regiment collapsed completely”—precisely because there weren’t “enough troops in the sector to deploy.” It seems the skeleton cohort of remaining troops—many of them women soldiers—and the Israeli settlers in the region had been left practically undefended at exactly the wrong time.
But the alleged intelligence “failures” didn’t stop there. In the years prior to the Hamas attack, Israeli intelligence capabilities over and within Gaza were eye-watering. Israel operates a fleet of satellites enabling it to monitor Gaza from space. Ofek-13 SAR systems enabled it to view Gazans in all weather and cloud conditions, night and day, with a ground resolution of 0.5m2.
The Hermes 900 drones, with both electro-optical (EO) and infra-red (IR) sensors, thermal surveillance monitors, laser designation targeting and electronic listening devices, were just one of a number of Israeli drone systems deployed over Gaza prior to the Hamas Attack. The Cyclone drone system was used both for spying and for crowd control. In 2021 Israel was the first country to deploy an AI-controlled drone swarm to locate, identify and attack its enemies. Israel’s drone surveillance of Gaza was so pervasive it led Gazans to complain of sleep deprivation due to the persistent “buzz” in the skies above their heads.
Israel’s cyber and electronic warfare capabilities were just as comprehensive. Again, in 2021, the US administration banned the commercial use of Israeli defence contractor NSO’s Pegasus spyware. It was able to hack pretty much any internet-enabled device—particularly mobile phones—through various software vulnerabilities. Pegasus could harvest personal and location data, control a mobile phone’s microphones and cameras—without the user’s knowledge or permission—and transmit data even after the user has switched the phone off.
Israel’s human (on the ground - HUMINT) intelligence prowess was equally formidable. Shin Bet HUMINT led the IDF to frequently intercept and shut down Hamas border tunnels. Shin Bet’s infiltration of Hamas’ literal underground network was so exhaustive, and Hamas so destabilised, that Hamas resorted to mass executions of suspected spies and possible collaborators. Shin Bet’s Mista’arvim counter-terrorism unit and the IDF’s elite Maglan unit were able to conduct targeted assassinations and many other acts of espionage and surveillance inside Gaza .
In addition to all of this, the Palestinians were the most surveilled and searched people on Earth. Everyone who entered or or left Gaza was subjected to the “Blue Wolf” system. Biometric ID, monitored by facial recognition software, combined with strictly controlled entry and exit permits were required at the armed checkpoints that were the only official way in an out of Gaza. The “Blue Wolf” system logged every movement on what Israeli intelligence operatives called “Facebook for Palestinians.” So extensive and intrusive was Israel’s spying on Palestinians that, in 2014, former members of Israel’s Unit 8200 wrote a joint letter to the Israeli government protesting the oppressive surveillance.
All of this electronic surveillance and human intelligence was scrutinised by the IDF Unit 9900. The Gaza-specific battlefield intelligence collection unit analysed the harvested data before deploying units of its Gaza Division, under IDF Southern Command, to strike Hamas and other “terrorist” targets.
There is absolutely no evidence at all to suggest the Israeli authorities decided to stop Satellite, cyber, SIGINT and HUMINT intelligence gathering in, around and above Gaza in the years leading up to the Hamas Attack. If the official narrative of intelligence “failures” is to be believed, however, then all of it must have “failed” completely . . . . . . . . for years.
Ali Baraka, the head of external relations for Hamas, said that preparations for the Hamas Attack took two years. Given the complexity and scale of the Hamas Attack this seems reasonable. If so, it implies that, for two years, Hamas commanders—most of its leaders lived in Doha but commanders like Mohammed Deif operated inside Gaza—met to formulate and communicate Hamas plans as required. Hamas issued the corresponding orders, assembled, trained and equipped its forces, gathered and stored the munitions and equipment needed for the large-scale assault and somehow managed to do all of this without once triggering a single Israeli intelligence alert.
What is even more remarkable is that immediately after the Hamas Attack, Israel’s vice like intelligence grip of anything that moves in Gaza was suddenly working again. By 11th November 2023, Shin Bet operatives were deep inside Hamas territory directing IDF strikes and coordinating assassinations. It seems the monstrous Israeli intelligence machine only failed totally—in every single conceivable regard—in respect to the October 7th Hamas Attack.
Hamas, by comparison, supposedly suffered no such catastrophic intelligence failures. They apparently used the cheap drones they probably bought from Amazon to make quite precise maps and gather targeting information for their October 7th Attack. Flying their little drones over highly sensitive Israeli military installations for days, with ease, they also gathered HUMINT from Israeli labourers who passed to-and-fro, across the Gaza border, without one Israeli intelligence officer thinking to ask any labourer what they were chatting to Hamas about. Or so we are told.
So, it appears Hamas was spying on Israeli military targets with abandon and training out in the open in large numbers next to the wall; Israeli civilians living near the Gazan border knew an attack was likely and, indeed, imminent and said so; numerous Israeli intelligence operatives issued highly accurate alerts; foreign intelligence agencies knew what was about to happen and told Israeli government officials about it; the Israeli government had a dossier outlining the precise plan—Jericho Wall—and Hamas even broadcast a video showing themselves training to execute that plan just weeks before carrying it out.
In addition, Gazan’s were relentlessly surveilled, their movement monitored and controlled. Intelligence operatives were evidently working inside Gaza and it was under intense scrutiny at all times by an almost unbelievable array of spy satellites, drones, bugs, cyber-surveillance and a smorgasbord of Israeli SIGINT tools.
But the Hamas Attack came as a complete surprise and no one in Israeli authority was prepared to defend against it.
One of the excuses given, evidently in hope of explaining the inexplicable “failures,” is that Israel’s over-reliance on technology and AI led it to undervalue information gathered from traditional human intelligence (HUMINT). This is not a plausible argument.
The overwhelming weight of evidence shows that neither Israeli technological surveillance-based intelligence nor human intelligence was lacking. There was no “failure” of human intelligence-gathering. Intelligence operatives, military observers and even civilian volunteers knew what was happening and did everything they could to raise the alarm.
The are only two viable explanations. Either everything that is known about Israeli intelligence capabilities is wrong and Israeli intelligence is actually worse than useless, or high-level decisions were made to deliberately ignore intelligence warnings.
As we shall see in Part 3, the manner in which Israeli forces responded on the day only adds further evidence that indicates the October 7th Hamas Attack was—from the Israeli perspective—at the very least, a LIHOP false flag operation, which appears to have strayed into MIHOP on more than one occasion..